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Abstract:  
Many accounts of surveillance and its subjective effects tend to focus on privacy. 
Along with this focus comes the assumption that surveillance’s objects are simply 
facts and attributes, straightforwardly “mined” (or stolen) from people’s private lives. 
Yet the habits and propensities ascribed to individuals through surveillance 
apparatuses are complex, relational phenomena: co-produced, selected and interpreted 
with interest by various actors. This essay begins to develop a critical language for 
surveillance as a form of characterization, by analyzing SWAMP’s McService (2003), 
Hasan Elahi’s Tracking Transience (2005-) and Erica Scourti’s Life in AdWords 
(2012-2013). Following Sara Ahmed, I theorize characterization as a “technology of 
attribution” that attaches such interpretations of character to people within surveillant 
scenarios. Drawing from literary studies as well as recent work on the surveillance 
economy, I analyze the forms of attribution made possible within the surveillant 
scenarios in each of the artworks I analyze. Within these works, which span a decade 
between 9/11 and the Snowden revelations, one can trace an evolution of structures 
through which such attributions manifest: from self as threat, to self as set, to self as 
product. 
 
 
Full Text:  
In 2003, the art collective SWAMP1 (Doug Easterly and Matt Kenyon) 
videotaped themselves going through a McDonald’s drive-thru fifty-seven 
consecutive times in Calera, Alabama (McService). The two artists order hotcakes, 
sausages, and other typical fast food in a perfectly usual way, recording footage as 
they go: the parking lot, McDonald’s employees handing them food, their meals and 
receipts, their chewing mouths and chatting. Several hours into their performance, it 
becomes clear that their behaviour has aroused suspicion; two police cars intervene. 
“You know how people get kinda touchy,” one of the officers intones, as he orders 
them not to go through the drive-thru again (SWAMP 2003). 
                                                
1 SWAMP stands for Studies of Work Atmosphere and Mass Production. It was founded in 1999 by 
Doug Easterly and Matt Kenyon, who worked together until 2012. Kenyon now runs SWAMP as a 
solo project.  
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What, exactly, aroused suspicion, so much so that someone called the police? 
Ostensibly, the drive-thru customers were the perfect consumers: generating ample 
sales, enacting the most zealous and insatiable of appetites. Yet the pattern of their 
behaviour was irregular (or, more precisely, it was so regular that it is irregular: 
completely “normal” activities repeated to the point at which they become a 
hyperbolic caricature of consumption). Repeating an action to such an extent that it no 
longer finds a grounding logic in the body’s appetites or in the routines of daily life – 
normative expectations as to what should motivate behaviour – signals that there must 
be other, strategic considerations informing the action. (The police officer asks, 
“What are you gentlemen looking for? What’s the prank, what’s the joke?”) 
(SWAMP 2003) The act of going through a drive-thru, unhinged from its usual 
motivations, acts as a sign of hidden, strategic motivation, the nature of which the 
actual act – going through the drive-thru in the usual way – reveals nothing.  
What might these hidden motivations be? SWAMP’s intentions appear to be 
largely analytical. They aimed to examine how the drive-thru siphons profits from 
local communities to international corporations, and produces a “regular pattern of 
information” as it does so:  
Control regulated by mass marketing and mass production is 
exchanged at the window, with regular intervals of profit occurring 
throughout the day. Our performance, despite the fact that we spent 
almost $200 in 5 hours, contradicted the semantics of this 
socioeconomic construct (SWAMP, McService).  
 
McDonald’s collects patterns of information from its customers, and not just money; 
their analyses of behavioural patterns impose far more exacting expectations on their 
consumers than simply that they spend as much money as possible. The artists seek to 
understand McDonald’s’ means of conceptualizing its customers. Yet these 
	 4 
intentions, while they might be clear to viewers of SWAMP’s documentation video, 
appear to be interpreted very differently by staff and police at the scene; SWAMP’s 
action, thus, also explores the differential readings of a seemingly “illegible” act by 
various interested parties. To some, McService analyzes corporate semantics; to 
others, it incites the spectre of a security threat – even terrorist threat (the ultimate 
image of threat in post-9/11 American life). By creating a complex scenario of 
looking, McService activates a field of tensions between overlapping surveillance acts 
and apparatuses, each of which attributes characteristics to its subjects in different 
ways.  
Further questions arise: in what ways, for instance, does corporate surveillance 
(McDonald’s’ interest in not only sales, but also who generates those sales) relate to 
police surveillance (which, in this case, seems aimed at pre-empting potential threats 
in response to citizen calls – even if its actual target ends up being consumer 
abnormality)? How do acts of citizen pre-emption (for instance, the employee who 
must have called the police to report SWAMP) relate to the counter-terrorist police 
apparatus? Consumerism and counter-terrorism: what do these two subspecies of 
surveillant motivation share, how do they diverge from one another – and how can 
their interconnectivity be felt, perceived and sufficiently analyzed in the complex 
relational milieus implicated in acts of surveillance?  
In this paper, I argue that surveillance performances by SWAMP, Hasan Elahi 
and Erica Scourti suggest an analytical method through which to approach the 
complexities of multiple, overlapping perceptions of motivation in surveillance. These 
artists extend their interactions with surveillant apparatuses, in order to grasp 
something of how these apparatuses – with all their complex assemblages of actors, 
motivations and perceptions – envision their subjects. Their works suggest a theory of 
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surveillance scenarios as sites of characterization. By characterization I mean 
complex, relational acts of attribution by which characteristics are ascribed to an 
object of surveillance, often based on some form of analysis of his/her propensities 
and patterns of behaviour (whether observed by people, through computational 
analysis, or with a combination of these). Characterization, the representational 
concept that best conveys how surveillance scenarios rely on the attribution and 
circulation of characteristics rather than their mere “discovery,” highlights the fact 
that representations of surveillant subjects are not simply reflections of who that 
subject “is,” but, rather, crystallize complex power relations between subject and 
state, and between consumer and corporation. Acts of characterization come into play 
in situations in which the relationship between a person’s patterns of action and their 
motivation come into question. Analyzing surveillance performances through the lens 
of characterization highlights the disjunctions between various forms of surveillant 
motivation, which play out differentially in – and, indeed, as – representations of 
surveillant subjects. Characterization enacts a form of commerce between self, state, 
and corporate interest, allowing representations of personhood, behavioural pattern 
and tendency to circulate and accrue legitimacy and value.  
 McService, Elahi’s Tracking Transience (2005-), and Erica Scourti’s Life in 
AdWords (2012-13) span ten years (2003-2013) between 9/11 and the Snowden 
revelations. Given the rapid changes in surveillance practices and players within this 
decade, these three works represent a fertile range of apparatuses, monitoring 
practices and concerns, involving many actors, from citizens, to police, FBI agents, 
online users, corporations, self-documentarians and algorithms. While McService 
focuses on pre-emptive citizen reporting and extra-legal police measures, Tracking 
Transience documents Elahi’s location and daily activities in obsessive detail online. 
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Finally, Scourti’s piece documents the artist keeping a daily diary, emailing it to her 
gmail account, and then reading out the AdWords Google’s algorithms selected to 
match her consumer profile. Each of these works experiments with making its 
performer(s) visible as surveilled subjects; in a play of exaggerated docility, the 
performers produce acts of what could variously be read as curiosity about, empathy 
with, or even submission to their respective surveillance apparatuses, giving each 
apparatus what it seems to “want” (an anomaly; full transparency; and a fertile range 
of emotions and interests amenable to consumer desire, respectively). The performers’ 
acts allow them (as well as their audience) to learn something about how such 
watchful eyes and sensors see. Through their complex, relational setups, these three 
pieces delineate an evolution, of sorts, between three different rhetorical structures 
through which surveillance-based characterization comes to be represented: from self 
as threat, to self as set, to self as product. 
 
Technologies of Attribution  
What kind of person would go through a drive-thru fifty-seven times in a row? 
SWAMP’s piece reveals the complexities with which the “character” of the involved 
actors comes into question, at moments in which an unusual behavioural pattern 
throws the relationships between action and intentionality into question. This focus, in 
fact, anticipated developments in surveillance practices and problematics that would 
become increasingly dominant – and increasingly automated – in the years to come. 
As Grégoire Chamayou notes, the National Security Agency’s task – to distinguish 
benign from nefarious intention, within oceans of information – is inherently 
problematic: “What algorithm would be capable of detecting behavioural indices that 
could unmask this kind of intentionality?” (2015, p. 4). In spite of the Orwellian 
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nightmares to which the NSA’s seemingly all-knowing gaze (revealed to the public by 
Edward Snowden in 2013) might justifiably give rise, Chamayou notes that the NSA 
has been spectacularly ineffective in foiling terrorist plots, contributing nothing 
whatsoever to public safety throughout its entire telephone metadata collection 
program (p. 8). Just as the pre-emptive prohibitions on SWAMP’s drive-thru 
activities, carried out by “touchy” McDonald’s staff and police in a fear-gripped, post-
9/11 America, failed to distinguish between an analytical artists’ project and a 
prospective terrorist plot, so the NSA’s sophisticated surveillance apparatuses seem 
far more likely to produce presumed intentions than to uncover them lurking behind 
abnormal behavioural patterns. As an analyst of surveillance practices, how can one 
begin to develop a critical language for such acts, which involve the active selection 
and production of characteristics? 
 Of course, many critical responses to surveillance practices in the post-9/11 
world take privacy as their central concern. While there are certainly important 
reasons to advocate the right to privacy, it is also necessary to point out privacy’s 
limitations as a lens through which to analyze the complex, relational milieus of ever-
shifting surveillance scenarios.2 As Mark Andrejevic writes, “Privacy debates… come 
to stand in for discussions that might more directly address the question of who 
controls the information infrastructure and for what ends” (2011, p. 279). Enacting 
customer loyalty in a surveillance economy, as SWAMP do in contracted fashion, 
involves fitting into corporate semantics, volunteering one’s information along with 
one’s cash. In a time of immensely concentrated wealth and power in the hands of a 
                                                
2 See, for instance, Dubrofsky and Magnet’s feminist critique of whose bodies are routinely granted, or 
denied, the right to privacy (2015, p. 4).  
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few corporate, computational and financial players,3 opting out of such schemes 
comes at a price. Privacy, in the face of vastly privatized interests, becomes a pricey 
proposition.  
Yet there is another fundamental, representational problem with the privacy 
debate. In painting images of governments and corporations peering into private lives, 
stealing traces of propensities, behaviours and intentions – seemingly traces of their 
subjects’ “true selves” – privacy advocacy fails to account for the speculative nature 
of intentions and propensities in the first place. Whose suspicion, for instance, is 
reflected in the police’s characterization of SWAMP as suspicious? The attribution of 
possibly nefarious intentions to the duo expresses complex speculations by various 
perceivers, as well as observed abnormalities in the actions of the perceived. Given 
this, and given the NSA’s complete failure to discern intentionality in complex 
behavioural patterns, it is misleading to imply that the objects surveillance 
apparatuses seek are unearthed, pre-existing coordinates from private lives. Rather 
than viewing the attributive acts of surveillance as invasions of privacy (though they 
certainly may be facilitated by these), conceptualizing them as complex, relational, 
and speculative sites of characterization more aptly speaks to the sense in which the 
suspicious characteristics of surveillance subjects are not so much found as they are 
produced.   
 “Characterization” describes acts through which “character” comes to be 
perceived and represented; yet the latter’s status as an object of study is far from 
uncontroversial. Even within literary theory, character has often been dismissed as an 
illusory, problematic and even conservative object of study. A generation of 
                                                
3 For an account of how the surveillance economy and how it concentrates wealth in the hands of a few 
businesses and financial players whose computational capacities can vastly outstrip their competitors, 
see Lanier (2014). 
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structuralist literary theorists viewed character as a humanist illusion to be dismantled 
through criticism.4 More broadly, character has been, to many, merely a moralizing 
concept, associated with a conservative tendency to blame structural issues, such as 
poverty, on their victims. (That the poor might lack the “character” to succeed in the 
job market, for instance, is a self-fulfilling apology for gross structural and economic 
inequalities.5) However, it is precisely for these reasons that character – and the acts 
of characterization through which it comes to be produced, perceived and 
conceptualized – merit further study in an era of widespread speculation. With ever-
proliferating surveillance apparatuses, which inscribe their subjects with 
characteristics in great detail and with a seemingly unquestionable realism, analyses 
of the complexities of attributions of “character” (a speculative, future-oriented, 
tendency-inscribed object par excellence) are incredibly urgent. Careful analyses of 
surveillance scenarios in which characterizations take place can denaturalize their 
ostensible realism, and reveal the complex interplays between individual lifespans and 
the actors (be they individuals, sensors, cameras, algorithms or complex combinations 
of these) that “read” them. Such interplays must navigate the tensions between a 
person’s complexity and the relative simplicity of characterization’s inscribed 
intentions; and between the “private” worlds of surveilled subjects and the ways in 
                                                
4 See, for instance, Deidre Shauna Lynch’s critique of, on the one hand, the ahistorical approaches to 
literary character articulated by Ian Watt and his followers, and, on the other hand, the structuralist 
approaches associated with Roland Barthes, Alain Robbe-Grillet, Hélène Cixous and Colin MacCabe, 
in the introduction of The Economy of Character: Novels, Market Culture and the Business of Inner 
Meaning (1998, p. 4-16). Equally indicative of the widespread tendency to denigrate the concept of 
character is New Literary History’s special issue on character (1974), of which Hélène Cixous’ essay 
“The Character of ‘Character’” is a prime example. As Rita Felski observes in her introduction to New 
Literary History’s 2011 issue on character (its first since the 1974 issue), “‘The Character of 
‘Character’” voiced a widespread sense among literary theorists that character survived only as a 
vestigial form. Tied to superannuated structures and coercive ideologies, it was a concept that seemed 
incapable of generating new knowledge” (2011, p. v). Despite the fact that character seemed so closed 
as a concept to literary theorists in 1974, Felski notes that several more recent studies, including 
Lynch’s, have reanimated the concept, articulating a “conviction that literary character can disclose 
rather than disguise” (2011, p. v). 
5 For just one recent example of how writers have associated character with a right wing tendency to 
blame the poor for their poverty, see Giridharadas (2015).  
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which that private experiences come to be represented and, as representations, shared 
through acts of observation.  
As Sara Ahmed (2011) suggests in her study of “problem characters” in 
nineteenth-century novels, it is useful to think of character as an object determined by 
looking, as a glimpse: “it is not that we have a glimpse of character but that a 
character is a glimpse, [is] what creates an impression that there is someone being 
glimpsed” (p. 232). To characterize a person is to play with the impression that one 
has reduced her essential qualities, behaviours and propensities from a larger whole in 
an act of perception (and perhaps preconception), fabricated a smaller set of attributes 
that seem to aptly express the whole, while still sensing the limits of this smaller set 
as knowledge of the “whole” person. If this is so, then surveillance apparatuses such 
as the NSA’s, which rely on vastly expanded data storage capacities,6 rewrite the 
relations between the total quantities of data collected and such productive acts of 
glimpsing, by expanding the palette of available information that can be used to 
characterize someone. As Edward Snowden put it, when asked why the average 
citizen should care about surveillance:  
It’s getting to the point, you don’t have to have done anything wrong. 
You simply have to eventually fall under suspicion from somebody, 
even by a wrong call, and then they could use this system to go back in 
time and scrutinize every decision you’ve ever made, every friend 
you’ve ever discussed something with, and attack you on that basis, to 
sort of derive suspicion from an innocent life and paint anyone in the 
                                                
6 It should be noted that in May 2015, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the U.S.A. Freedom 
Act (by an overwhelming majority), which curbs the NSA’s ability to collect phone metadata in bulk. 
This bill would seemingly limit the NSA’s access to personal data, and thus its powers to characterize 
individuals, going forward. Yet as Shane Harris points out, this bill’s passing has actually been viewed 
as a big win for the NSA within the intelligence community. The U.S.A. Freedom Act does not actually 
end the phone records program; it merely “requires that phone companies, not the NSA, hold onto the 
records” (Harris 2015). With just “a little more trouble,” the NSA can still access all of the records, 
without having to shoulder the cumbersome and extremely expensive task of maintaining the databases 
themselves (Joel Brenner, former inspector general of the NSA, quoted in Harris 2015). The bill, 
arguably, merely outsources the NSA’s data storage operations to the corporate sector. 
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context [sic] of a wrongdoer. (Davidson, 2013; Greenwald et. al, 2013) 
 
Deriving suspicion from innocent lives: Snowden’s image aptly captures the sense in 
which characterization emerges out of complex and interested acts of selection and 
attribution. Given vast amounts of personal information to play with, characterization 
involves actively selecting palettes of facts and tendencies and painting with them, 
reconstructing representations of someone’s character out of swaths of information, 
attributors’ desires, perceptions, representational tropes, bureaucratic procedures, 
power relations, and computational capacities. As we will see in the next section, 
Hasan Elahi’s self-surveillance project, a website on which he constantly updates his  
whereabouts and documents his activities, similarly navigates the tensions between 
vast quantities of personal data and their reduction through acts of characterization. 
(Yet, while Snowden articulates the dangers of a security agency having vast 
quantities of data with which to characterize its subjects, Elahi, as a victim of FBI 
racial profiling, uses vast quantities of self-generated personal data as a means of 
ensuring his security, correcting the FBI’s bias.) With the capacity to analyze such 
vast quantities of data, algorithmic analyses can interpret their subjects’ behaviours 
like never before. Yet in spite of any such conceit to realism – to adequately (could 
we say democratically?) represent the whole person from whom these few qualities 
have, somehow, become elected representatives – characterization is always (to use 
Ahmed’s phrase), a “technology of attribution,” an ascribed sense of self-fulfilling 
intentionality that “establishes ‘the commerce’ between reader and text” (2011, p. 
233). If, as Ahmed suggests, such a description of characterization might be extended 
beyond the bounds of fictional worlds to describe relations between readers and 
characters, then surely it can also be repurposed as a fitting description of the 
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commerce between surveillance apparatuses and their subjects, describing how 
characteristics are attributed and exchanged between various actors.  
Characterization, as “technology of attribution,” speaks to the ways in which 
tendencies to understand certain subjects as more “problematic” than others might be 
self-fulfilling. Racial profiling, of course, is a prime example of this. Elahi, along with 
millions of non-white people in the U.S. and elsewhere, know very well how 
pervasively and violently the state can differentially attribute suspiciousness 
according to racist preconceptions.7 Writing in the aftermath of yet another recent 
instance of police brutality against African-Americans (this time, an attack against 
teenagers at a pool party in McKinney, Texas), Sinthujan Varatharajah (2015) reflects 
on the pervasive internalization, for racialized subjects, of being characterized as a 
threat:   
Growing up in white suprematist societies many of us have been 
conditioned to work hard to remain invisible… we grow up 
internalizing the criminalization of our bodies and are taught from 
childhood life-saving lessons to circumvent these macro- and micro-
aggressions. It is these many little moments that accumulate 
throughout our lives when we, for instance, pull the seatbelt tighter 
when the cops drive by, when we dress in ways to not appear as 
threats, when we make sure that the supermarket bill is visible to not 
be considered looters, or when we choose to not call out racism 
(2015). 
Varatharajah compellingly portrays how deeply internalized is the threat of constant 
characterization for non-white Americans, who must expend so much effort, day in 
and day out, simply to appear non-suspicious – or, rather, simply not to appear as a 
subject of interest. 
                                                
7 See, for instance, McClanahan on the laundering of racial bias in supposedly “objective” FICO® 
credit scores (2014, p. 47-48); Harcourt (2007) on racial profiling in predictive policing practices (both 
mentioned above); Dubrofsky and Magnet’s emphasis on the ways in which new categories of racial 
identification are emerging in surveillance scenarios, such as the “terrorist look-alike” (2015, p. 9); and 
Chamayou’s discussion of the use of racist sobriquets in NSA training material, as well as new forms 
of racial profiling emerging in the realm of big data analytics (2015, p. 4) 
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Characterization, as a concept, covers both acts of attribution that are directly 
linked to preconceptions about race, sexuality and gender, and those that appear more 
minutely adapted to assess individual traits and propensities (even though these, of 
course, are by no means entirely separable from larger identificatory categories). Yet, 
while surveillance apparatuses can characterize anyone, it is important to remember 
that some bodies have a much harder time passing as unsuspicious than others. In a 
field of newly proliferating, automated and arguably correlative “technologies of 
attribution” – big data analytics, social media platforms and credit scoring 
innovations, for instance8 – characterization speaks to the active yet subtractive, 
perceptual and conceptual work of attribution, which actively creates characteristics 
to match preconceived problems. “Put simply,” Ahmed writes, “when someone 
becomes a problem, we tend to question their character” (p. 233). Characterizing 
someone as a threat is contingent on a warp and woof of interests and biases that 
predetermine who – or what – counts as a problem. 
From Threat to Set: Character, Quantity and Spectres of Motivation 
Both SWAMP and Elahi examine these complexities. While SWAMP’s piece 
speaks to the constitution of self as threat, Elahi’s moves from self as threat to self as 
set. McService demonstrates, with elegant simplicity, how easily absurd repetition 
unhinges action from motivation. In this piece, the performers’ actions have lost their 
legibility with respect to hunger and other motivating factors that would normally 
determine an individual’s decision to go to McDonald’s. Enjoyment, a reliable source 
                                                
8 For more detailed accounts of such developments and a discussion of their implications, see Cheney-
Lippold (2011), Hallinan & Striphas (2014), Gillespie (2012, 2014), Striphas (2010), Pariser (2011), 
Palmås (2011), Hearn (2010), McClanahan (2014) and Naughton (2014). I call such technologies 
“correlative” due to the fact that many forms of prediction and analysis associated with big data rely on 
detecting, and then cybernetically correcting, statistical correlations and rendering them actionable 
through prediction. Such developments aptly illustrate Deleuze’s concept of “control societies” (one of 
the by now classic conceptualizations of the significance of computer-based, panspectric surveillance), 
which, in part, function by producing “dividuals” who are subject to statistical correlation (1992). 
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of legible motivation, does not have a stable relationship to quantity; whereas one 
McDonald’s meal might be enjoyable (to some), dozens in a row would surely not be. 
Their illegibility provokes terror, at the heart of post-9/11 life in the West, that 
quotidian actions to be détourned for nefarious purposes. The employees’ decision to 
call the police can be understood as pre-emptive; it seeks to stop “vaguely suspicious” 
behaviour from escalating, manifesting a dangerous intention. 
 In the post-9/11 domestic security climate, character is the speculative object 
of pre-emption par excellence. As Brian Massumi (2007) has argued, there has been a 
wholesale shift toward pre-emption as an “operative logic of power” in contemporary 
politics and military tactics. Pre-emption, for Massumi, acts on a fundamental 
uncertainty in a world in which potential threats have not fully formed, and may not 
have even yet emerged. In order to fight a threat that has not yet emerged – is not yet 
knowable – it is best to provoke it into concrete existence. Snowden’s image of 
“deriving suspicion from an innocent life,” in light of Massumi’s argument, shows 
how characterization acts in tandem with pre-emptive logic. “Character” and 
characteristics (such as being “suspicious”) are always speculative, and often self-
affirming objects; in McService’s case, they are brought into being through fear as an 
affective agent through which potential future threats can act on the present. 
SWAMP’s piece demonstrates how such indeterminately present futurity plays out in 
the sphere of domestic security in post-9/11 America, through citizen fear and extra-
legal police prohibitions.  
 If McService speaks to the speculative creation of a threat simply through 
repetition unhinging action from intention, American artist Hasan Elahi’s Tracking 
Transience (2005-) does just the opposite: it ameliorates threat through repetition. In 
2002, Elahi was detained at the Detroit Airport on his way back from an exhibition in 
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Amsterdam. Without knowing why he had come under suspicion (perhaps another 
with his name had been placed on a no-fly list?), he was held and questioned by the 
FBI for hours about the reasons for his frequent travels, whether he had visited any 
mosques, and whether he had moved explosives out of a storage unit. His familiarity 
with American culture, as well as showing the agents his Palm Pilot filled with 
records of gallery exhibitions, meetings and talks, eventually led to his release. He 
was subjected to lie detector tests, and required to check in with FBI agents for six 
months back in Tampa, where he lived at the time. How could he ensure that he 
would not be detained, or characterized as a threat, in the future? As he put it, “Once 
you're in the system, you're in… It's incredibly disturbing when a country, particularly 
your own country, uses discrimination as a basis for an investigation" (Scharper 
2013).  
In response to these experiences, Elahi began notifying the FBI whenever he 
left the country, in order to avoid hassles in airports. Eventually, this practice led him 
to launch Tracking Transience: the Orwell Project. On his website, 
www.trackingtransience.net (2005-ongoing), he frequently updates his location, and 
posts copious photographs of the scenes that comprise his everyday life: meals, 
highways, hallways, toilets, airports, gas stations, chain stores, and signs. The current 
version of the website begins with a homepage detailing his most recently entered 
coordinates with a flashing red arrow on top of a map and a scroll over a photo of the 
location. (The maps are produced in collaboration with the United States Geological 
Survey, which provides aerial surveillance images in response to his photographs’ 
geographic coordinates.) (Creative Capital) Without warning, the page begins to flash 
through images (or whole subsets of images) from Elahi’s life: perhaps an unmade 
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bed in a hotel room, a nondescript watering hole, or a mosaic of small images of 
toilets or tacos compiled from various locations on various days.  
Elahi’s project responds to surveillance, yet without advocating for privacy in 
a straightforward way. Indeed, although he ostensibly gives up his privacy, Elahi 
claims to lead a very private life, in spite of – or even, given that he has pre-empted 
the FBI’s targeting him, because of – constantly sharing its coordinates (Ashraf 2010). 
Rather, Elahi’s work intervenes in the economy of surveillant information. As he puts 
it, “I share everything with the FBI — and everyone… Their currency is secrecy and 
access to information. Making information public devalues their currency” (Creative 
Capital). Given this analysis, we could say that Tracking Transience tackles 
privatization rather than privacy as such – it is not the individual’s right to privacy 
that is the object of critique, so much as the ability of secrets (be they governmental or 
corporate) to generate value for some while they impoverish the power of others. 
Surveillance is part of an economy that garners value due to its being held privately, 
at an advantage over others; such value diminishes as soon as that information 
becomes public. If characterization establishes a commerce between a represented 
person and his/her “readers” (be these governmental agencies, corporate players or 
online user-citizens), then Elahi’s project explores a way to enact that commerce 
differently, making his “character” more widely available so as to counter the 
privatization of his information-assets.  
Further, Elahi’s images of mass-produced objects, architectures and meals 
establish his “normalcy” as a consumer – but reveal little, if anything, of his thoughts, 
ideas or intentions. His images are sparse, unpopulated and banal. No friends or 
family come to view; there are only objects, meals, places and occasional passersby in 
the distance – a portrait of an alienated, consumerist life, rendered in the first person. 
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The photographs bring to mind Ed Ruscha’s series of deadpan portrayals of American 
locations (such as Twentysix Gasoline Stations, 1963). Like Ruscha’s, Elahi’s images 
seem to dissolve their own interest in spatial specificity. Presenting spatially specific 
phenomena as so many quantities overwhelms their specificity, draws attention to the 
tensions between the local and the non-local in these scenes. On 
trackingtransience.net, users witness mass-produced outputs of globalized corporate 
and financial circuits, whose origins, structures and workings are just as obscure to 
the casual observer as the inner workings of a surveillant subject’s mind might be to 
the FBI (even when it has some help from citizens like Elahi, who correct at least 
some of its misattributions). 
Unlike in Ruscha’s project, Elahi (as target, referent, viewpoint, persona) 
remains the conceptual focus of the work, even as the specificity of his own life seems 
to disappear into an atmosphere of everyday artifacts. Focusing on his setting – the 
spaces and scenes of his life – he becomes a set, in the mathematical sense of “a 
collection of things (called its members or elements), the collection being regarded as 
a single object” (Enderton 1977, p. 1). Elahi appears as nothing more than the sum 
total of all locations, surroundings, activities and meals experienced (or, at least, 
indexed, evidenced), photographed and put into circulation by his website. He turns 
the cameras, becoming, in a sense, an empty container – nothing more than a first-
person perspective that links so many objects and environments. The sum total of 
these is his character, his represented being – but one which turns the focus away 
from his own particularity and onto the world he witnesses. Tracking Transience 
proposes the set as an alternative structure through which to represent character online 
– one which devalues privatized information currency, shifts the focus away from 
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racialized bodies, and democratizes the weight given to each of Elahi’s (often rather 
mundane) activities, eroding exceptions with tides of represented habits.  
Tracking Transience seems ever more prescient, as today, droves of citizens 
routinely volunteer information about their activities, meals, and whereabouts on 
social media. Elahi’s project acts on the faith that sharing information about so-called 
“private” life will, in a sense, de-privatize its information-flows, decrease its 
usefulness to government agents who only derive value from that to which they have 
privileged access. This is certainly the case in some instances (in Elahi’s case, the 
public’s witnessing his project tempers the FBI’s singular hold on characterizing him 
as “threatening” or “non-threatening”). That said, there are also a host of recent 
developments in big data analytics that allow corporations to benefit from users’ free 
sharing of personal information online.  
Life in AdWords 
London-based artist Erica Scourti examines some of these developments, 
which make newly automated forms of characterization possible. For almost a year 
(March 2012 – January 2013), she emailed her daily diary to her gmail account, to see 
what kinds of AdWords would come up. She then “performed to webcam the list of 
suggested keywords linking to clusters of relevant ads” (Scourti 2013a). This process 
resulted in deadpan readings of disjointed, generic yet oddly personal clusters of 
words and phrases, at times hilariously at odds with her webcam-recorded image as a 
lived being-in-time. As she reads (often, it appears, in her bedroom at home, dressed 
casually, and at times accompanied by a black and white cat), the keywords settle in 
clusters on varying aspects of her activities, emotions, musings and social roles. Some 
of the keyword clusters relate to generic experiences that reveal more about the time 
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of year (and how it is feted by large groups of people) than about Scourti herself. 
“New Year’s eve. Drank. Drank too much. Fireworks. Good wishes for New Year,” 
begins her January 2013 AdWords compilation (2013b). Other keyword clusters offer 
glimpses of her interests and concerns as an artist; MFA degree programs, London 
galleries and shipping solutions all feature. Still other keywords seem to speak to 
consumer concerns – prospective spending habits or online searches (for song lyrics 
or friendship poems, for instance); and to health and physical ailments (severe sore 
throats, or the benefits of drinking water). Finally, there are those keywords that touch 
on subjects typically coded as private, and even “internal:” anxieties, stress, 
depression, emotions, love and relationships. Essential to each of these provisional 
categories is a rhythmic ebb and flow that sees them waft in and out of each other’s 
purview, loosely weaving together scraps of separate activities, anxieties and aspects 
of identity. In her March 2012 compilation, she recites: “Lyrics lyrics. Feeling tired. 
Always feeling sad. Feeling depressed. Healthy eating food. Music and lyrics. Eating 
out. Song lyrics.” And the next day, slumped in bed, she reads: “Love relationship. 
Love relationships. Love and romance. Severe sore throat. Lyrics lyrics. Anxiety and 
depression. Anxiety and stress. Depression and anxiety” (Scourti 2012a). The 
keywords circulate feelings, interests and concerns, quite literally, as commerce in an 
attention economy, in which companies pay for the privilege of having their websites 
stand out from millions of others by competing in keyword auctions. What 
substantiates these keywords’ claim to value is that they are hinged on algorithmic 
“readings” of the individual online user and, thus, ostensibly closely reflect her 
expressed habits, interests and concerns – her character.  
 That habits shape character is certainly nothing new. In The Gay Science (first 
published in 1882), Nietzsche remarks that when someone has worked the same job 
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for several years, he in effect becomes the character he once merely played (1974, p. 
302). From playing to being: character is that which stiffens through work, repetition 
and time. What is the analogous scenario to Nietzsche’s in an era of immaterial 
labour, in which an “alienated cognitariat” (as Franco “Bifo” Berardi [2010] calls it) 
drifts from job to job, task to task, contract to contract? The keywords algorithms that 
Scourti’s piece reveals highlight at least two new means through which habits stiffen 
into representations of character in the surveillance economy. On the one hand, the 
concept of the working self, here, extends beyond the traditional, liberal-era realms of 
work to encompass consumer behaviour, entrepreneurial activities associated with 
landing art projects, the emotional labour of maintaining personal relationships, and 
the like. One’s character encompasses more than simply a particular role one plays in 
a specific context; it blends work, consumption, personal life and entrepreneurialism, 
navigating the tensions between all of these roles and conceptualizing each of them 
as, in some sense, equal forms of immaterial labour. On the other hand, the 
automaticity and ubiquity of such readings reifies the rhythmic flux and flow of 
habits, interests and concerns, making their stiffening into representations of 
“character” through algorithmic analysis a matter of course. Yet neither of these 
statements go far enough; for there has also been a complete reversal. The worker – 
for all her precarity, her anxieties, her endless mixing of heterogeneous tasks and 
social roles – becomes a product, whose attention, tendencies and even identities are 
sold to Google’s corporate clients.  
 As Christian Fuchs writes, “Google commodifies users’ cognition, 
communication and cooperation by engaging in surveillance of these activities, 
creating data about them and selling these data to advertising clients” (Fuchs 2011). 
Google AdWords, a primary agent of this political economy, is based on an auction 
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system through which advertisers compete for prominent screen positions with respect 
to keywords linked to specific users (Fuchs 2011; Girard 2009, p. 31). While Google 
may well be a pioneer in selling such specificities to advertisers, it encompasses only 
one amongst a host of recent developments in monetized online surveillance. John 
Cheney-Lippold (2011) refers to some such developments in his work on algorithmic 
identity production, which he understands as a form of “soft biopolitics.” He describes 
the online data collection practices of, for instance, the Quantcast corporation – one of 
many companies that provides audience measurement services for member websites, 
thus helping them to best target advertisements to individual IP addresses. Based on 
browsing history, one of Quantcast’s algorithms might decide that in individual user 
is, for instance, male. Maleness emerges as a trait, in Quantcast’s formulae, purely 
numerically, without any reference to the user’s embodied identity.  
Yet, conversely, the identifications at which the algorithms arrive self-modify 
in a cybernetic loop, sometimes overturning or modifying the initial assumptions that 
led to a particular identification being made in the first place. In the process, Cheney-
Lippold argues, “the regulation of gender as a category… becomes wholly embedded 
within the logic of consumption, where categorical behaviours are statistically defined 
through a cybernetics of purchasing and research that marketers have deemed 
valuable for identification and categorization” (p. 171). This new algorithmic identity, 
Cheney-Lippold argues, operates at a distance from traditional liberal politics, and 
enacts a form of control best understood according to Deleuze’s concept of 
modulation (1992), which “configures life by tailoring its conditions of possibility,” 
rather than directly disciplining subjects (p. 169). As online identification apparatuses 
constantly – and automatically – characterize users based on their consumptive and 
affective labour, they shape users’ potential future online experiences along the same 
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lines as their characterizations, thus actively closing the loop between characterization 
and subjectivation.  
Scourti’s piece stages a dialogue between two descriptive technologies for 
representing complex, interior life (one very old, the other quite recent): the diary (as 
a form of becoming-character through self-representation) and its algorithmic analysis 
(an apparatus that characterizes). As she continually reads her AdWords, a double 
pedagogical process takes place. She “teaches” Google’s algorithms to recognize her 
more efficiently – to translate diaristic interiority into algorithmic interiority. In doing 
so, she learns something of how these algorithms see; as she reads out her keywords, 
it is almost as if she is learning how to speak their language.9 This language wrests 
interests, doubts and desires into clouds of tendencies. Scourti’s actions point to the 
cybernetic feedback loops at the heart of a newly emerging “political economy of 
propensity” (Thrift 2009)10 articulated, in large part, through data analytics 
companies, online advertisers and social media platforms. These apparatuses analyze 
older modes of documenting interior complexity (for instance, letter writing 
reconfigured as email), in real time, in hopes of securing future value in the present. 
In her May 2012 compilation of AdWords, Scourti speaks to such concerns in the 
language of AdWords’ algorithms: “Relaxation techniques for anxiety. Predict future. 
Tell me my future. I want to know my future” (Scourti 2012b). This string of 
                                                
9 Ted Striphas’ work helps to conceptualize this dialogue further (Hallinan and Striphas 2014; Striphas 
2012; Granieri 2014). His term “algorithmic culture” describes the ways in which algorithms 
increasingly do traditional “cultural” work: “of the sorting, classifying, and hierarchizing of people, 
places, objects, and ideas” (Granieri 2014). For instance, Google and Facebook use algorithms to 
determine what appears in a specific user’s search engine. 
10 As Thrift (2009) argues, there is a newly emerging “political economy of propensity” in 
contemporary societies, the outlines of which have yet to be entirely written. Propensity, he argues, 
should be “understood jointly as both a tendency-cum-attraction and an innate inclination, that is, as a 
disposition to behave in a certain way which is only partly in control of the agent” (p. 83). Extending 
Thrift’s work, we could say that the ever more ubiquitous predictive and pre-emptive practices of 
algorithmic surveillance (or dataveillance, as Van Dijck, 2014 prefers to call it) trade in propensity, 
routinely produce and monetize its images out of desires, disturbances and moods that are partly 
personal, and partly expressions of “imitative rays” of shared interests, feelings and behaviors that 
spread through social networks. 
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AdWords seems meant to appeal to the “personal” anxieties about the future 
attributed, by algorithms, to Scourti; yet perhaps they speak even more loudly to how 
such anxieties (be they actual or invented through analysis) have fallen into lockstep 
with the surveillance apparatuses’ own preoccupations with prediction, propensity, 
risk assessment and producing value through these. If Elahi’s piece represented 
character as a set of indexed habitual experiences and tendencies in order to devalue 
the highly anomalous attributions to which he had been subjected by the FBI, then 
Scourti’s piece grapples with the commercialization and normalization of 
characterization through the analysis of precisely such rhythms of habits and 
tendencies. Scourti’s piece analyzes a structure of characterization as a cybernetic 
feedback loop in which algorithmic analyses of her tendencies align with and shape 
the personal desire for self-actualization11 in complex ways.   
Characterizing Differently? Toward a Critical Language of Attribution 
With each surveillant act of characterization comes a complex expression of 
the interplay between a surveillance apparatus and the “character” of its subject. 
Several actors’ and apparatuses’ inclinations, perceptual capacities, economic 
interests, presuppositions and desires actively shape how a characteristic can come to 
be attributed to its character. Scourti’s project clearly demonstrates this by setting up a 
nuanced, ongoing dialogue between her self-reflection through writing and the 
algorithms that track her, amplifying certain doubts, desires and consumer interests 
over others and transforming these into monetized attention-lures. Elahi’s project 
takes the FBI’s desire for his transparency to an extreme, and sees its subject dissolve 
                                                
11 Self-actualization, in itself, can be understood as a form of neoliberal governmentality. As Michel 
Feher (2009) argues, concepts of self-appreciation are inextricably linked to the emergence of the 
concept of “human capital” in the mid-twentieth century, which initially referred to “the set of skills 
that an individual can acquire thanks to investments in his or her education or training” (p. 25).  
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into a haze of locations, habits and objects that open surveillance onto other forms of 
witnessing and self-characterization. While Elahi’s website inscribes – and protects – 
his lifespan with a “safe” range of represented, repetitive habits and tendencies, 
SWAMP uses repetitive, habitual behaviour against the grain, as (to use Massumi’s 
term) “threat-o-genic.” Repeated behaviours, in SWAMP’s setup, unmoor action from 
intention, throwing character into question. All of these projects establish character as 
a vitally important, speculative object of surveillance. Characteristics belong to no 
one person, since they are always attributed relationally; as such, their problematics 
are those of privatization (which determines which actors have the representational 
power to attribute characteristics to others most forcefully within a given surveillant 
milieu), rather than of privacy.  
SWAMP, Elahi and Scourti provide insightful studies of these emerging 
dynamics. In doing so, their projects also suggest that an adequate response to 
contemporary surveillance involves developing new criteria for characterization: a 
critical language for the ways in which characteristics can be selected, elected and co-
produced from available data sets and tendencies by various interested parties. Such a 
language could speak far more pointedly than privacy to the aesthetic and speculative 
dimensions of surveillant citizenship, in an era in which representations of 
individuals’ futurity have ever more influence on their present. 
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